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A he last decade has seen
extraordinary changes in U.S. welfare
programs. Even as early as 1970, with
greater numbers of mothers in paid
employment, public opinion had begun
to shift toward an increased emphasis on
work as an alternative to welfare. The
shift to an employment-focused system
gained momentum in the 1990s, initially
with states modifying Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC)
under federal waivers, and culminating
in passage of the federal Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act in 1996. This
bipartisan legislation, which replaced
AFDC with Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), established
explicit program participation and work
requirements for participants, limited the
length of time recipients could receive
aid, and further expanded state autonomy.
Reform-oriented policy changes
during the 1990s were accompanied by
major declines in the national caseload.
After peaking at 5.0 million in 1994,
caseloads began a decline, falling to
3.9 million in 1997, the year TANF was
implemented in most states, and 2.6
million in 1999, a level not seen since
1970. While increasing numbers of

families are transitioning from welfare
to work, whether welfare leavers will
succeed in achieving stable employment
and economic self-sufficiency over the
long term remains in question. Many
recipients face significant barriers to
employment, and those who get jobs
commonly cycle in and out of work, earn
low wages, and often continue to rely on
government supports.
In this article we present findings
from Welfare and Work: Experiences
in Six Cities, in which we examined
welfare participation and labor market
involvement of female welfare recipients
during the 1990s. Our analysis relied
on individual-level welfare data linked
to state earnings records for the core
counties in six major urban areas
Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort
Lauderdale, Houston, and Kansas City
which together accounted for around 5
percent of the nation's welfare caseload
in 1991. 1 The selected sites provide
considerable diversity, as they include
cities from a very low-benefit state
(Texas) and a classic northern urban area
(Chicago), two cities on the border of the
old South (Baltimore and Kansas City),
and a traditional southern city (Atlanta).
Three of the cities have significant
representation of Hispanics.
The cities chosen also allowed us to
examine the extent to which differences
in state and local policy, administrative
directives, and local labor market
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conditions contribute to observed
trends. Policy and administrative
changes designed to move families
from the rolls have been facilitated by a
growing economy, much more so than
in the late 1980s and early 1990s during
implementation of earlier reforms. Other
supportive policy changes including
expansions of the federal Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, and child
care subsidies were also occurring
during this period.
Caseload declines vary among our
sites but are substantial. They bracket
the national decline, ranging from 44
percent in Kansas City to 81 percent
in Fort Lauderdale. Many of the legal
and policy changes following from

Overall, we conclude that the
kinds of jobs welfare recipients
obtain have not seriously
deteriorated over the 1990s.
welfare reform focused on the activities
of recipients, attempting to create both
incentives and opportunities for them
to obtain employment and exit welfare.
Time limits pushed people from the rolls,
and mandatory programs attempted to
help recipients build job skills and obtain
employment. Some elements of welfare
reform were also designed to reduce entry
onto welfare. Explicit diversion programs
were adopted by many states, in some
cases requiring potential recipients to
engage in job search before applying
for welfare. Our analyses show that at
each of our sites, increases in the welfare

exit rate alone would have produced
important caseload declines, ranging
from 30 to 64 percent. Yet declines in
the numbers entering welfare contributed
substantially as well, causing caseloads to
fall by 20 to 71 percent.

suggests that reforms were somewhat
successful in achieving the act's
employment goals. A fuller understanding
requires looking at the types of jobs
welfare leavers obtained and the factors
determining their employment success.

Employment of Welfare Leavers

Looking at Recipients' Jobs

Employment of leavers is of
particular concern because national
and state welfare reforms placed
increased emphasis on this route of
exit from welfare. Those supporting
welfare reforms argued that training
and related provisions, in conjunction
with work requirements, would move
welfare families into the world of work,
providing them with new opportunities
for betterment. Critics warned that it was
more likely that reforms would force
those who were ill-prepared for work to
seek aid from family, private charities,
or less restrictive public programs,
causing increased hardship and ultimately
damaging the welfare of their children.
Table 1 provides employment rates
for those exiting welfare in each of
our sites. We see that rates increased
substantially between 1994 and 1997
but changed little between 1997 and
1999. These results do not accord with
the views of either the supporters or the
critics of reform. Moderate increases in
the employment rates for welfare leavers
in the face of the extraordinary economic
growth in the 1990s do not suggest
unprecedented opportunity for those who
left welfare. On the other hand, the fact
that employment rates did not decline

A central goal of welfare reform
is moving recipients into stable jobs.
Welfare recipients tend to have unstable,
short-term jobs, with few benefits and
low wages. Although we are unable to
determine benefits, wage records allow
us to determine how long an employee
receives earnings from a given employer.
Table 2 provides information on the
stability of jobs obtained by welfare
recipients. Only about half of all jobs
last beyond the quarter in which they
start, and this proportion did not change
appreciably between 1994-1995 and
1998-1999.
Only 4 10 percent of jobs last eight
quarters or more. In three of the five sites
where we can make comparisons, we
see that the number of such long-term
jobs has declined. Although these results
might suggest a decline in the quality of
jobs welfare recipients obtain, we found
that similar declines occurred for other
workers in the same firms. And, even
where job stability has declined, earnings
have not. Overall, we conclude that the
kinds of jobs welfare recipients obtain
have not seriously deteriorated over the
1990s.
While changes over time are modest at
best, by any standard welfare recipients'
jobs are poor ones. Over the life of the
job up to two years for our data
average cumulative earnings are only
between $2,000 (for Atlanta) and $5,000
(for Chicago).2 Few of these jobs lead to
economic self-sufficiency for mothers
with one or more dependents. Some
individuals may obtain sufficient earnings
to move off of welfare and support their
families if they succeed in cobbling
together multiple low-paying jobs into
a semi-steady earnings stream. Others
may stumble onto a good job only after
many tries.

Table 1 Employment Rate for Welfare Leavers in Six Areas
Area

1994

Employment rate (%)
1997

Atlanta

58.5

64.5

61.2

Baltimore
Chicago
Fort Lauderdale
Houston
Kansas City

44.8
48.6a
53.3
43.7
57.6

54.6
54.5
53.2
50.4
65.2

59.7
56.7
55.4
49.1
66.0

1999

NOTE: All measures apply to federal fiscal year (October-September) unless indicated otherwise.
Site measures are means for four quarters.
a Fiscal year 1996.
SOURCE: Authors'calculations
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Table 2 Stability of Jobs Held by Welfare Recipients in Six Areas

Variables
Atlanta
Baltimore
Chicago
Fort Lauderdale
Houston
Kansas City

Probability that job lasts
more than 1 quarter

Probability that job lasts
more than 7 quarters

1994-95

1998-99

1994-95

1998-99

0.472
0.536
0.539
0.517
0.533
0.441

0.457
0.525
0.561
0.519
0.527
0.428

0.050
0.089
0.100
0.075
0.073
0.044

0.050
0.060
0.097
0.068
n/a
0.032

SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
Finding a Good Job
Although opportunities clearly are
limited, recipients who obtain the best
jobs have substantial advantages. In
all of our areas, the standard deviation
of total earnings on a job is at least 50
percent greater than the mean, implying
that some jobs provide reasonably
good long-term earnings in these urban
labor markets. In considering how a
particular welfare recipient achieves
stable employment, it is natural to ask

Despite the poor prospects
offered by the average welfare
recipient's job, we find
evidence that some jobs do
offer greater opportunities.

employ many welfare recipients, we find
that employers differ from one another
quite dramatically. Some employers
appear to offer unstable employment
and low wages to all their employees,
whereas others offer relative stability and
higher wages.
One may be concerned, however,
that observed differences between
employers are the result of unmeasured
differences between individuals. If some
employers hire particularly capable
individuals, but the differences between
individuals are not readily observable,
we may mistakenly assume that they
offer desirable jobs. If this were the case,
there would be no benefit in placing less
qualified workers with such employers,
since they would be expected to face
summary dismissal. Fortunately, we

are able to examine the importance
of unmeasured individual factors,
since many welfare recipients obtain
multiple jobs. As might be expected,
our analysis confirms that unmeasured
differences between individuals do play
an important role. But we find that even
after controlling for such person "fixed
effects," substantial differences between
jobs remain.
An indication of the extent to which
jobs differ can be seen by observing
industry differences. Figure 1 reports the
total expected earnings for jobs in five
industries, controlling for unmeasured
individual characteristics. Although there
are differences across our sites, variation
in expected earnings across industries is
generally consistent. As expected, jobs in
temporary help services firms provide the
lowest expected total earnings, reflecting
both shorter duration of employment and
lower quarterly earnings. Retail trade
provides somewhat greater job stability
and higher earnings, as does restaurant
work. Manufacturing jobs are appreciably
better than jobs in these other industries,
often with total earnings two or three
times those for temporary help jobs.

Conclusions
The 1990s saw a dramatic shift
in the character and focus of welfare

Figure 1 Predicted Total Earnings for Job in Selected Industries
how important individual characteristics
are in determining job stability and
earnings. If individual characteristics
are of primary importance, there is
little benefit in placing individuals with
certain employers, since the only route
to achieving economic self-sufficiency
will be to augment their human capital. In
contrast, if certain employers offer highly
desirable jobs jobs that provide high
stability and earnings to any incumbent
individuals lucky enough to land them
will do relatively well over time.
What factors determine differences in
earnings and job stability across jobs? We
find that demographic characteristics play
a role, but their effects are quite modest.
In contrast, the industry of the employer
is of substantial importance. Furthermore,
when we examine those firms that

Eating, drinking
D Atlanta

Manufacturing

11 Baltimore

SOURCE: Authors' calculations.

Retail trade, other

Chicago

Temporary help

Fort Lauderdale

Houston

Other service
D Kansas City
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in the United States. The proportion
of recipients working increased
substantially, and employment also was
more prevalent among those leaving
welfare. However, the kinds of jobs
obtained by welfare recipients did not
change dramatically. Expected earnings
and job stability remained low for most
recipients of cash assistance, and few of
the jobs recipients landed could assure
economic self-sufficiency.
Despite the poor prospects offered
by the average welfare recipient's job,
we find evidence that some jobs do offer
greater opportunities. Even recipients
who have had a string of dead-end or
short-lived jobs may ultimately be able
to obtain a job providing a reasonable
chance for economic self-sufficiency.
Federal and state reforms of the
1990s have not altered this dynamic
significantly. The goal of reduced
dependency has been attained in that
fewer individuals now receive cash aid
and more are working. But there is no
evidence that reform has substantially
improved the lives of recipients or former
recipients.
Congress continues to struggle with
reauthorizing the Personal Responsibility
Act, having passed a series of temporary
extensions since the Act expired at the
end of September 2002. Yet differences
between the House and Senate over
work and participation requirements,
allowable activities, and other issues
have been substantial enough to keep
those bodies from succeeding in Grafting
new legislation. Our research supports
the view that the reforms of the 1990s
were successful in moving individuals
off the welfare rolls and into jobs. But
if the ultimate goal is economic selfsufficiency and not simply reductions in
"dependency," revisions of the program
will need to go far beyond the reforms
currently envisioned.

Notes
1. Our analysis uses data from the county
containing the central city. For convenience, we
refer to each area by the city name.
2. This figure is the sum of earnings for as long
as the job lasts, up to eight quarters, with earnings
adjusted for inflation and reported in 1999 fourthquarter dollars.

David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury

Refundable Tax Credits
for Health Insurance
NOTE: This article summarizes David W.
Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury's
"Refundable Tax Credits for Health Insurance:
The Sensitivity of Simulated Impacts to Assumed
Behavior, " Upjohn Institute Working Paper
05-119, 2005. See http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/wp/05-119.pdf.

Dissatisfaction with the level
and growth of the share of the U.S.
population without health insurance
has spurred interest in alternatives to
the existing system of financing health
care, which is dominated by employerprovided health insurance among the
nonpoor and nonelderly. One approach
to reform would be to adopt a refundable
tax credit for health insurance under
the federal personal income tax. Such a
policy would grant a tax credit up to a
prespecified maximum for example,
$1,000 for an individual or $2,000 for a

Clearly, these wide simulated
ranges highlight the uncertainty
inherent in modeling the effects
of health insurance tax credits.
family on a tax return where the filer
purchased a private, nonemployer health
insurance policy. For filers whose tax
bill was less than the amount paid for
insurance, the difference between the tax
bill and the credit would be paid to the
filer hence, the refundable nature of the
tax credit.
The refundable tax credit is attractive
for at least two reasons. First, it would
make the same tax-favored treatment
of health insurance available to all
individuals, regardless of whether
they are employed and regardless of
whether their employer provides a
health insurance plan. As a result, it
should increase the number of insured
individuals and decrease uninsurance.
Second, a tax credit would generate
growth in the market for private
nonemployer health insurance and

increase the population of health care
consumers that have an interest in
the characteristics and cost of their
coverage. These informed, cost-conscious
consumers could put a brake on
increasing health care costs.
The extent to which a tax credit for
health insurance would reduce the
number of uninsured individuals has been
controversial. Pauly, Song, and Herring
(2001) and others have simulated a
variety of different tax credit policies and
have found that a "reasonably generous"
credit could reduce the number of
uninsured individuals on the order of 50
percent. However, simulations by Gruber
(2000a,b) suggest that a health insurance
tax credit might reduce the number of
uninsured by only about 10 percent.
Here, we summarize a recent study
replicating and extending Gruber's
simulations (Emmons, Madly, and
Woodbury 2005). Our goal is to
illuminate Gruber's modeling of health
insurance coverage under a tax credit and
to examine the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the model's key parameters;
that is, we want to understand what
makes the simulation model tick. The
findings from this exercise are most
relevant to Gruber's widely discussed
findings and to the particular tax credit
analyzed. The simulations should not be
interpreted as being relevant to proposals
that, for example, would cover different
populations, would apply tax credits of a
different amount, or would eliminate the
exclusion of employer contributions for
employees' health insurance premiums
from employees' taxable income.

Outline of the Simulation Model
The simulation model we use is
essentially a set of rules for determining
whether a given individual (or family)
would take up a federal refundable tax
credit of $1,000 (for a single individual)
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or $2,000 (for a family) for privately
purchased health insurance. We follow
Gruber in identifying four groups, each
facing different circumstances with
respect to health insurance:

Table 1 Results of Simulation: Group Take-Up Rates, Number of Individuals
Accepting Tax Credit, and Total Net Government Cost of Tax Credit

Take-up rate (%)

1) those currently covered by employerprovided group health insurance,
2) those covered by private
nonemployer insurance,
3) those covered by Medicaid,
4) those currently uninsured.
For each group, we specify an
equation for the tax credit take-up rate
the probability of a person accepting the
tax credit. We also vary each take-up rate
equation so as to give a lower-bound and
an upper-bound take-up rate for each
group.
For individuals currently covered
by employer-provided group health
insurance, we assume a lower-bound
elasticity of take-up with respect to the
subsidy provided by the tax credit of
0.625 (relatively unresponsive behavior)
and an upper-bound elasticity of infinity
(that is, a worker with employerprovided health insurance accepts the
credit whenever he or she would incur
lower expenses by doing so). For those
currently covered by private nonemployer
health insurance, the lower-bound
assumption is that 50 percent would
take up the credit, and the upper-bound
assumption is that 90 percent would take
up the credit.
For those currently covered by
Medicaid, we assume an elasticity of
take-up with respect to the credit subsidy
of 0.2. We then obtain lower-bound
estimates of the take-up rate by imputing
(or assigning) health insurance costs
and expenditures to an entire family,
and upper-bound estimates by imputing
costs and expenditures to each individual
separately. For currently uninsured
families and individuals, we assume
the probability of taking up the credit
depends on income and the size of the
subsidy, with an elasticity of take-up with
respect to the subsidy of 0.625. Lowerand upper-bound take-up rates again
come from imputing health insurance
costs and expenditures to an entire family
and to each individual separately.

Group

Number of
individuals accepting
(millions)

Net government
cost ($ billions)

(3)
lower
bound

(4)
upper
bound

(5)
lower
bound

(6)
upper
bound

1) Covered by employerprovided group insurance"
a. Hedonic imputation of
employer contribution

3.3

21.6

4.9

32.4

1.9

b. BLS imputation of
employer contribution

7.4

35.4

.11.1

53.2

5.5

22.0

2) Covered by private
nonemployer insurance*5

50.0

90.0

10.4

18.6

9.5

17.1

3.3

6.7

0.6

1.3

-2.2

-4.9

17.5

28.3

7.7

12.5

7.4

9.7

3) Covered by Medicaidc
4) Uninsured0
Total

23.6-29.8 64.8-85.6 16.6-85.6 31.7-43.9

a For individuals covered by employer-provided group health insurance, lower-bound simulations assume
an elasticity of take-up with respect to the tax subsidy of 0.625; upper-bound simulations are based on the
assumption that all workers who would reduce their expenses by switching to private insurance do so. The
alternative simulations for individuals covered by employer-provided insurance are based on two alternative
imputations of the worker's contribution to employer-provided group health insurance.
b For individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance, lower-bound simulations are based on the
assumption that 50 percent of covered individuals accept the tax credit; upper-bound simulations are based on
the assumption that 90 percent accept the tax credit.
c For individuals covered by Medicaid and for uninsured individuals, lower-bound simulations are based on
the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made for entire families; upper-bound simulations
are based on the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made individually.
,
SOURCE: Authors'calculations.

The simulations are based on the
March 1999 annual demographic file of
the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which has data on 132,324 individuals
under age 65. We supplement the CPS
with the 1999 Survey of EmployerSponsored Health Benefits, conducted
by the Kaiser Family Foundation and
the Health Research and Education Trust
because the March CPS does not include
data on the health insurance premiums
paid by employers, or on employees'
contributions for employer-provided
insurance.
What the Simulations Suggest
Table 1 displays the main results of the
simulation model outlined above takeup rates (columns 1 and 2), the number
of individuals accepting the tax credit
(columns 3 and 4), and the government's
net cost of a refundable tax credit
(columns 5 and 6). Except for those

already covered by private insurance, the
figures reflect the number of individuals
who switch from their current health
insurance status to private nonemployer
insurance.
For individuals currently covered
by employer-provided group health
insurance, the simulations yield a
broad range of take-up rates from
3.3 to 35.4 percent, depending on the
underlying assumptions. Simulated
ranges for the number of individuals
who would switch from employerprovided to private insurance (5-53
million) and for the government's tax
expenditures on this group ($1.9-$22
billion) are correspondingly broad. The
lower-bound estimate of 3.3 percent is
very close to Gruber's estimate of 3.2
percent, suggesting we have succeeded in
replicating Gruber's simulations.
For individuals covered by private
nonemployer insurance, the take-up rate
is assumed to be 50 percent (the lower-

JULY 2005
bound) or 90 percent (the upper-bound).
The implication is that between 10.4 and
18.6 million privately insured individuals
would accept the tax credit, and that
government expenditures on tax credits to
these individuals would range from $9.5
to $17 billion (row 3 of Table 1).
For individuals covered by Medicaid,
the simulation model gives a take-up
rate of between 3.3 and 6.7 percent,
which implies that between 0.6 and
1.3 million current Medicaid recipients
would switch to private insurance (row
4 of Table 1). Net government costs
for those initially covered by Medicaid
actually fall by $2.2-$4.9 billion
because it is less expensive to subsidize
private nonemployer insurance for these
individuals than to provide them with
Medicaid.
For the uninsured, the simulations
yield a lower-bound take-up rate of 17.5
percent and an upper-bound take-up
rate of 28.3 percent. It follows that the
tax credit would reduce the number of
uninsured by 7.7-12.5 million from
about 44 million (or 18.4 percent of the
nonelderly U.S. population) to between
31.5 and 36.3 million (or between 13.2
and 15.2 percent). Gruber's take-up rate
(and the corresponding reduction in the
uninsured population) is somewhat lower
than our lower-bound estimate, but we
come close to replicating his findings.
The simulations suggest that tax
credit expenditures on those who were
previously uninsured would be between
$7.4 and $9.7 billion or between $776
and $961 per newly insured person.
However, the net government cost of
the tax credit ranges from about $16.6
to nearly $44 billion because the credit
can be used by groups other than the
previously uninsured. If the low end of
the range ($16.6 billion) pertains, then
the average cost to insure a previously
uninsured person under the tax credit
would be just over $2,100. However, if
the high end ($43.9 billion) pertains, then
the average cost per previously uninsured
person would be about $3,500.
Discussion
What do we learn from these
simulations? Our replications and

extensions of Gruber's (2000a,b)
simulations suggest that a refundable tax
credit of $ 1,000 for a single individual
or $2,000 for a family for private health
insurance would reduce the number
of uninsured individuals by between
17.5 and 28 percent and require new
government expenditures of between
$16.6 and $44 billion, of which about
$7.4-$9.7 billion would be for coverage
of previously uninsured individuals.
Clearly, these wide simulated ranges
highlight the uncertainty inherent in
modeling the effects of health insurance
tax credits. Pauly, Song, and Herring
(2001) point to model specification and
assumptions about the premiums faced
by the uninsured as the main sources of
uncertainty. These add up to uncertainty
about individual and family take-up
rates, and, as they write, "this uncertainty
... should be front and center in the
evaluation of tax credit schemes since we
as analysts have minimal experience with
large subsidies directed at low-income
individuals." In addition, some tax credit
proposals could lead to broader changes
in health insurance markets, such as
greater price competition among insurers.
This is yet another source of uncertainty
in modeling tax credit proposals.
The next question is whether direct
empirical evidence could reduce
uncertainty about tax credit take-up rates.
Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) and
Currie (2004) have reviewed evidence
on the take-up of a wide variety of social
programs and show that take-up rates
vary greatly from program to program.
Their reviews suggest that little basis
exists for choosing a most likely point
estimate from the range of simulated
take-up rates shown in Table 1 the
lower-bound estimates in column 1 of
Table 1 may well be too low, and the
upper-bound estimates in column 2 may
be optimistically high, but little more can
be said.
Obtaining convincing empirical
evidence on take-up of a health insurance
tax credit will not be cheap it may
require a demonstration project or social
experiment. But progress on the issue
of tax credits for health insurance will
require improved evidence on the likely
take-up rate of a credit, and the time and

expense of such a demonstration may
well be justified if it leads to convincing
estimates of how tax credits would expand
coverage and what they would cost.
David W. Emmons is Director of the Center for
Health Policy Research at the American Medical
Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Eva Madly is a research analyst at the W.E.
Upjohn Institute.
Stephen A. Woodbury is a professor of
economics at Michigan State University and a
senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
This article reflects the opinions of the authors
and should not be interpreted as representing the
views of the organizations for which they work.
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2005 First Round Grant Awards
This year, the Institute s Research Grant and Mini-Grant
Programs were changed to include two funding cycles. We are
pleased to announce the recipients ofgrants given under the
first cycle. They are as follows:

Research Grants
Rachel Connelly, Bowdoin College, and Jean Kimmel, Western
Michigan University, on the topic "The Role of Caregiving in
Mothers' Time Use: Recent Evidence from the New American
Time Use Survey."
Harry Holzer, Georgetown University, and Carolyn Hill,
Georgetown University, on the topic "Education and
Employment Outcomes of Minority Youth: What Determines
Success or Failure?"

New This Year: A Second Round of Grants

Mini-Grants
Jean Abraham, University of Minnesota, on the topic "Valuing
Variety: How Much Do Workers Value Having Choices among
Health Insurance Plans?"
Cynthia Bansak, San Diego State University, on the topic "The
Effects of Public Health Insurance on Job Lock: A Study of the
State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)."
Sarah Hamersma, University of Florida, on the topic "The Use
of Federal Work Opportunity and Welfare-to-work Tax Credits
by Temporary Help Service Firms and their Implications for
Workers' Labor Market Outcomes."
Luojia Hu, Northwestern University, on the topic "Layoffs and
Lemons: the Racial and Gender Disparities."
Robert Turner, Skidmore College, on the topic "Who Benefits
When Enterprise Zones Are Zoned Out? The Case of the Ohio
Enterprise Zone Program."

The deadline to apply for research grants under this year s second cycle is August 2, 2005. Mini-grant proposals under the second
cycle are due October 18, 2005. For more information visit http://www.upjohninstitute.org/grantann.html.

New Books
Unemployment Compensation
Throughout the World:
A Comparative Analysis

Welfare and Work
Experiences in Six Cities

The Economics of
Sustainable Development

Christopher T. King & Peter R. Mueser

Sisay Asefa, Editor

The authors examine changes in
welfare participation and labor market
involvement of welfare recipients in
six major cities
during the 1990s.
This allows them to
determine the extent
to which differences
in state and local
policy, administrative
directives, and
local labor market
conditions contribute to the trends in
caseloads, employment, and well-being
observed among former recipients.

This book provides an economic
perspective on a number of critical issues
that characterize the topic of sustainable
development. These
THE ECONOMICS OF
SUSTAINABLE include natural
DEVELOPMENT resource preservation,
economic inequality,
population growth
and agriculture,
and property rights.
Contributors are
Malcolm Gillis,
E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen,
Vernon W. Ruttan, David Lam, Daniel W.
Bromley, and Scott M. Swinton.

200 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-319-7 /
$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-318-9 / 2005

191 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-321-9 /
$15 paper ISBN 0-88099-320-0 / 2005.

Wayne Vroman & Vera Brusentsev
Vroman and Brusentsev achieve
four principal objectives: 1) to establish
the link between macroeconomic
performance in the product market and
in the labor market and to argue for the
role of unemployment protection; 2) to
provide an overview of Unemployment
Compensation (UC) programs throughout
the world, including case studies of
individual countries in four specific
regions that highlight the unique
difficulties facing UC programs in each
of the four regions; 3) to introduce the
reader to the issue of actuarial costs of
UC programs; and 4) to discuss three
important problem areas facing UC
coverage, continuing benefit eligibility,
and policies to shorten the duration of
unemployment and UC benefit duration.
273 pp. $41 cloth ISBN 0-88099-323-5 /
$20 paper ISBN 0-88099-322-7 / 2005.

The first chapters of these books are available to read at our Web site:
http: //www. upj ohninstitute.org.
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